GDP

NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE: Pessoa and Van Reenen on Decoupling

This article originally appeared in National Review Online

Tyler Cowen points us to a fascinating new paper by João Paulo Pessoa and John Van Reenen, both of the Centre for Economic Performance at LSE, on decoupling in the US and the UK. First, the authors differentiate between “net decoupling”

the difference in growth of GDP per hour deflated by the GDP deflator and average compensation deflated by the same index 

and “gross decoupling”

the difference in growth of GDP per hour deflated by the GDP deflator and median wages deflated by a measure of consumer price inflation (CPI).

It turns out that while there has been very little net decoupling, there has been considerable gross decoupling, particularly in the US:

This difference between gross and net decoupling can be accounted for essentially by three factors (i) wage inequality (which means the average wage is growing faster than the median wage), (ii) the wedge between compensation (which includes employer‐provided benefits like pensions and health insurance) and wages which do not and (iii) differences in the GDP deflator and the consumer price deflator (i.e. producer wages and consumption wages). These three factors explain basically ALL of the gross decoupling leaving only a small amount of “net decoupling”. The first two factors are important in both countries, whereas the difference in price deflators is only important in the US.

It is fairly well established that (i) is a significant phenomenon and that (ii) plays a role for middle-income and high-income workers, and it is interesting to see the role of (iii) and how it varies across countries. 

The Sad Statistic That Trumps the Others

This article was originally published in The New York Times

There’s been a lot of bad economic news lately, yet we may be overlooking the most disturbing development of all: our economic productivity has been weakening. This isn’t just a problem for the United States. Because America remains a leader in technology and innovation, it is also a matter of concern for the entire world.

Productivity statistics are hardly exciting reading, but they are important. Our society is wealthy precisely because it can churn out products like automobiles, flush toilets and Google search algorithms at relatively low cost. Productivity slowdowns mean erosion of living standards over the long haul, and they also can lead to short-term crises. If productivity turns out to be much lower than expected, it often means that we have borrowed too much and taken on too much risk. Retrenchment can make a recessionlonger and deeper.

The overlooked piece of news came this month from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In the second quarter this year, it reported, nonfarm business labor productivity fell by 0.3 percent, the second quarterly drop in a row. And it turns out that it rose only 0.8 percent from the second quarter of 2010. Over the last year, hourly wages have risen more quickly than productivity.

These factors have helped to keep the labor market sluggish and have thwarted a potential recovery.

Yet these numbers don’t capture the entire issue, and are themselves plagued by an array of problems. One bias in the economic statistics — which never shows up in published revisions — is embedded in the health care sector, where third-party payments, subsidies and care quality are hard to monitor and measure. A result is that a dollar spent on health care does not necessarily mean a true dollar’s worth of value added. The United States spends more per capita on health care than any other country, yet without producing measurably superior results. To the extent that some of these expenditures are wasteful, the gross domestic product and productivity numbers overstate economic growth.

Here’s another problem: Expenditures on the military and domestic security have risen since 9/11, but those investments are intended to neutralize external threats. Even if you agree with this spending, it generally doesn’t produce useful goods and services that raise our standard of living.

One of the most commonly cited productivity numbers describes per-hour labor productivity, but this, too, has intrinsic flaws. Labor force participation has been falling for more than a decade, and low-skilled workers are leaving the work force in disproportionate numbers. Taking some lower-paying jobs out of the mix will raise the measure for average productivity, which is hardly the same as increasing the economic gains from a given set of workers or, for that matter, from putting more people to work by making them more productive.

It is increasingly clear that many of our current economic problems predate the financial crisis, even if the crisis accelerated them or brought them into clearer view. A recent study by E. J. Reedy and Robert E. Litan, both researchers at the Kauffman Foundation, found that sluggish job creation was a long-term trend. For instance, job creation from start-ups has fallen every decade since the 1980s, raising the specter of an America with an innovation shortfall.

Keynesians argue that the economy is suffering from a lack of spending or too little “aggregate demand.” That’s a valid point, but innovation is one means of stimulating demand. When the iPad and iPad2 arrived on the market, for example, the spending was there to support them, which suggests that more innovation could help turn around the business cycle.

One problem may be offshoring by American companies, as stressed in a study by Michael Mandel, chief economic strategist of the Progressive Policy Institute, and Susan Houseman, senior economist with the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. Some productivity gains from the manufacturing of the iPad are captured by workers in China, who make important parts of the device, rather than by American workers. American companies often save on costs by finding lower wages abroad, not by enhancing the abilities of American workers. That would help explain why measured productivity has often been high over the last decade while despite year-to-year variation domestic wages and job creation have been flat.

My point is not to attack offshoring, which eases innovation and benefits poorer workers in the source countries. In any case, we cannot imprison capital in the United States. The relevant point is that even after the recent downward revisions, the domestic productivity statistics may be understating the bad news.

Finally, there is a growing realization that while the Chinese economy is wonderful for cutting costs and improving manufacturing methods, it will not soon be taking the lead in creating breakthrough products. For all the money spent on R.& D. in China, Chinese scientific papers are not cited much abroad and Chinese patents are filed at a low rate internationally, suggesting that they are less than revolutionary. Dan Breznitz, a professor at the Georgia Institute of Technology, and Michael Murphree, a doctoral candidate there, have discussed the incremental nature of Chinese innovation in their new, illuminating book, “Run of the Red Queen.”

In other words, the next wave of major innovation will probably rely on the world’s current scientific leaders, many of whom are based in the United States. Recently, though, Americans have not been getting the job done, and it’s starting to sink in that the real story is the truth on the ground — not the published numbers.

This article has been revised to reflect the following correction:

Correction: August 28, 2011

The Economic View column last Sunday, about the decline in economic productivity, misspelled the name of an organization where researchers had studied sluggish job creation. It is the Kauffman Foundation, not Kaufmann. (Its full name is the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation.)

What Germany Knows About Debt

This article was originally published in The New York Times

In many countries, including the United States, there are calls for the government to spend more to jump-start the economy, and to avoid the temptation to cut back as debts mount.

Germany, however, has decided to cast its lot with fiscal prudence. It has managed rising growth and falling unemployment, while putting together a plan for a nearly balanced budget within six years. On fiscal policy and economic recovery, Americans could learn something from the German example.

Twentieth-century history may help explain German behavior today. After all, the Germans lost two World Wars, experienced the Weimar hyperinflation and saw their country divided and partly ruined by Communism. What an American considers as bad economic times, a German might see as relative prosperity. That perspective helps support a greater concern with long-run fiscal caution, because it is not assumed that a brighter future will pay all the bills.

Even if this pessimism proves wrong more often than not, it is like buying earthquake or fire insurance: sometimes it comes in handy. You can’t judge the policy by asking whether your house catches on fire every single year.

Keynesians have criticized fiscal caution at this point in the economic cycle, arguing that fiscal stimulus will give economies more, not less, protection against adverse events. But is that argument valid?

Certainly, in Germany, the recent history of fiscal stimulus wasn’t entirely positive. After reunification in 1990, the German government borrowed and spent huge amounts of money to finance reconstruction and to bring East German living standards up to West German levels. Millions of new consumers were added to the economy.

These policies did unify the country politically but were not overwhelmingly successful economically. An initial surge was followed by years of disappointing results for output and employment. Germany’s taxes remain high, and overall West German living standards failed to rise at the same rate as those of most other wealthy countries.

Persuading former East Germans to spend more as consumers turned out to be less important than making sure that they had the skills to mesh with the economic expansion of the country. It is no surprise that many Germans are now skeptical about debt-financed government spending or excessive reliance on domestic consumers.

In recent times, Germany has shown signs of regaining a pre-eminent economic position. Policy makers have returned to long-run planning, and during the last decade have liberalized their labor markets, introduced greater wage flexibility and recently passed a constitutional amendment for a nearly balanced budget by 2016, meaning that the structural deficit should not exceed 0.35 percent of gross domestic product.

Amid the sluggish economies of much of Europe, Germany has booming exports and is nearing full capacity utilization. And many of its workers are postponing vacations to produce, and earn, more. The unemployment rate in Germany is 7.5 percent — below that of the United States — and falling.

Far from embracing this social democratic model, American Keynesians have criticized it for relying too heavily on exports and not enough on spending and debt. Yet it is not just the decline in the euro’s value that supports the German resurgence.

Most of the other euro-zone economies are not having comparable success because they did not make the appropriate investments and reforms. Moreover, the euro is still stronger than its average value since 2001, which suggests that the recent German success is not attributable only to a falling currency.

In any case, the Germans are exporting much quality machinery and engineering (not just glitzy autos), which can help other nations recover. It is an odd state of affairs when the relatively productive nations are asked to change successful policies because of an economic downturn.

The German government is also making credible long-term commitments to reduce its debt. Germany’s ratio of debt to G.D.P. has been hovering in the unhealthy range of more than 70 percent, and the country has one of the lowest birth rates in the developed world, which raises the question of how to pay for future pensions.

Yet many investors consider German bonds a haven, in part because the government has a reputation for addressing fiscal issues promptly and responsibly. It is working to cut government spending, although not in crucial long-term areas of research and education.

Germany is likely to continue having a higher relative level of government spending than the United States. But the German civil service has a stronger hand in writing legislation — a role that limits the sort of waste and short-term thinking that Congress injects into American law. It is also well understood in German political discourse that tax cuts need to be paid for.

The German economy is far from perfect. In addition to high taxes and a low birth rate, there are potential solvency problems in German banks, and these institutions lack transparency. Furthermore, poorer countries may need a looser monetary policy from theEuropean Central Bank than Germany wishes to support.

Nonetheless, it’s a common German attitude that adding debt, whether private or public, will not solve those problems. In fact, debt can provide the illusion of relief and thus postpone their resolution. Increased spending is a quick fix for what are very often more fundamental difficulties.

The point is not that Americans can or should copy Germany. But are German policy makers so wrong in their long-term orientation? We can lecture, or we can listen. The choice is ours.